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LEGISLATION
ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS: THE RIGHT
AND ITS RESTRICTION
The Common Law
Time out of mind until today, in all parts of the free world, one
of man's most prized privileges has been his right to contract.' And,
as an integral part of this right, men have been free to change,
modify 2 or terminate 3 contracts they had previously made. These
agreements of modification and termination, like other contracts,
were effective only if they contained all the essential elements of a
contract, such as mutual consent 4 and consideration.5 But, when
the required elements were present, these agreements could be writ-
ten or oral and, at common law, were effective, in either form, to
alter or discharge written contracts. 6 Only those contracts which
I Contracts and the inherent, though frequently inarticulate, right to con-
tract, have been recognized in systems of jurisprudence from earliest times.
See AaxsToTL's CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS (Translation by Von Fritz and
Kapp) 126 (1950); MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 390-391 (1883); THE
CODE OF MAIMONIDES (Yale Judaica Series-1949); 3 HoLDswoRTH'S HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 412-454 (3d ed. 1927); Williston, Freedom of Contract,
6 CORNELL L. Q. 365, 366 (1921) ; Ordinance of 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRI-
ToRiAL GOVERNMENT Art. II. "The general right to make a contract . . . is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution." Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53 (1905).
However, this right is qualified, not absolute, since it is subject to the para-
mount interests of the community. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. R. v.
McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567 (1911).
2 See United States v. Ozmer, 181 F. 2d 508 (5th Cir. 1950); Bartlett v.
Stanchfield, 148 Mass. 394, 19 N. E. 549 (1889); Vidvard v. Cushman, 35
Hun 18 (N. Y. 1885); Keating v. Price, 1 Johns. 22 (N. Y. 1799).
3 See Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., 252 N. Y. 468, 169 N. E. 648 (1930);
McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E. 198 (1890); Parmly v. Buckley, 103
Ill. 145 (1882). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §402 (1932); 5 CoRDIx,
CONTRACTS § 1236 (1951).4 See Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 47 (1876).
5 See Melville v. Kruse, 174 N. Y. 306, 66 N. E. 965 (1903) ; McCreery
v. Day, supra note 3. In New York, written contracts of modification or dis-
charge are valid even without consideration. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 33 (2).
See also N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW § 203. "An agreement modifying a contract
within this Article needs no consideration to be binding." UNIFORM ComMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-209(1) (Final Text Edition, November 1951).
6 See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E.
378 (1919); see Solomon v. Vallette, 152 N. Y. 147, 151, 46 N. E. 324, 325
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were required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing 7 or which
were under seal 8 were unaffected by these oral agreements. In all
other instances, however, the validity of the oral contract was recog-
nized. Furthermore, under a logical extension of this rule of recog-
nition, those provisions in a contract, requiring all modifications to
be written, were held to be ineffective since such provisions them-
selves could be repudiated, via oral agreement, by the parties. Simi-
larly, those contracting parties who sought to limit the possibilities
of contract amendment, and who were rebuffed by the operation of
this substantive measure, found no refuge under evidentiary rules.
Because these unwritten agreements were necessarily reached at a
time subsequent to the writing, and not prior to nor contemporane-
ous therewith, they were beyond the scope and prohibition of the
parol evidence rule.'0 In the event of subsequent litigation therefore,
the contents of these oral transactions could be established by parol
evidence.
In spite of the fact that recognition of oral agreements, and the
introduction of evidence showing their contents, was based on funda-
mental principles of contract,"- and evidence 12 law, these modifica-
tion agreements proved to be as vulnerable to mistaken or perjured
claims as other oral contracts. The same possibility of incorrect or
fraudulent allegations, which led to the creation of the Statute of
Frauds, was here present. Yet, even though the parties took the
precaution of preparing a written contract, that statute furnished no
protection against changes in the large number of agreements whose
subject matter was not specifically covered.13 In fact, the only valid,
(1897) ; Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 121 Conn. 163, 183 At.
887, 894 (1936).
7 Clark v. Fey, 121 N. Y. 470, 24 N. E. 703 (1890); Hill v. Blake, 97
N. Y. 216 (1884); see Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 454, 127
N. E. 263, 265 (1920) (concurring opinion).
8 Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925);
I. B. Miller Contracting Corp. v. Carlton Co., 257 App. Div. 244, 12 N. Y. S.
2d 971 (1st Dep't 1939), rez'd on other grounds, 282 N. Y. 633, 25 N. E. 2d
980 (1940); Cohen v. Jaffe, 218 App. Div. 259, 218 N. Y. Supp. 135 (4th
Dep't 1926) ; see Tischler v. Kurtz, 35 Fla. 323, 17 So. 661, 664 (1895). But
see RFSTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 407, comment c (1932).
9 Wiener v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 61 F. 2d 893 (2d Cir.
1932); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378
(1919); Bartlett v. Stanchfield, 148 Mass. 394, 19 N. E. 549 (1889); see
Salinas v. Salinas, 187 Misc. 509, 514, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 385, 390 (Sup. Ct.
1946); see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 407, comment a (1932).
10Pechner v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 65 N. Y. 195 (1875); Haight v.
Cohen, 123 App. Div. 707, 108 N. Y. Supp. 502 (2d Dep't 1908); Allen v.
Sowerby, 37 Md. 410 (1872); see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrs § 632 (rev. ed.
1936).
11 See notes 2, 3 and 6 supra.
12 See note 10 supra.
13 For an enumeration of those contracts required to be in writing, see N. Y.
PERs. PROP. LAW § 31 and N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242.
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voluntary method by which the parties to a contract, which never
had to be in writing, could protect themselves against improper claims,
was by executing their contract under seal.14 But, while this was the
rule, it was not applied in a way which would have completely voided
all oral or informal modifications of sealed instruments. On the con-
trary, the courts justifiably enforced certain types of such contracts.
Among those upheld were primarily two classes of agreements: first,
those informal agreements which had been performed and which the
courts refused to overthrow,15 and second, those agreements upon
which one party had relied, and when such reliance proved detrimen-
tal, the defendant was estopped from denying its validity.1 6 Enforce-
ment of these oral agreements on the basis of performance or detri-
mental reliance necessarily limited the effect of a seal upon future
contract modification. For all practical purposes, the seal successfully
prevented only executory agreements from competently modifying or
discharging written contracts.17 Later, written executory agreements
were authorized for this purpose in New York by a specific statutory
provision.' 8 But despite these limiting influences, the seal retained
the power to nullify executory oral alteration 19 and since the possi-
bilities of fraud still existed,20 the desire of the law to negate any
such occurrence presented a reason for the seal's retention.
Although the seal thus successfully filled a need of the contract-
ing parties, its use for this preventative purpose was manifestly un-
14 "Any written contract, other than specialties ... can be rescinded or
varied at will by the oral agreement of the parties. . . ." 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 1295 (1951) (emphasis added). See 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), REPoRT,
N. Y. LAw REvisioN CommissioN 351 (1936). "It is not the purpose of
the law to permit such an instrument to be modified or changed by parol state-
ments or agreements resting in fallible human memory, influenced, perhaps,
by personal or property interests." Rosenshine v. Lebovitz, 139 Misc. 258,
259, 248 N. Y. Supp. 235, 236 (N. Y. City Ct. 1931). For discussion of in-
equities resulting therefrom, see McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 7-9, 23 N. E.
198, 199 (1890).
15 McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890); McCreery
v. Day, supra note 14. "[G]enerally a sealed contract may be modified
or rescinded by a parol or simple written agreement which is wholly or partly
executed. . . ... 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), REPORT, N. Y. LAw REvisioN
CoIMIssION 178 (1936).
"6Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 477, 126 N. E. 263 (1920);
Harris v. Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572 (1921) ; Becker v. Becker,
250 Ill. 117, 95 N. E. 70 (1911).
17See French v. New, 28 N. Y. 147, 149 (1863). "[A] sealed con-
tract cannot be modified or discharged by an unsealed executory agreement."1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), REPORT, N. Y. LAw REVISION Co isussIoN 178(1936). But see Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E.
781 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
18 N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 342 (effective September 1, 1935).
19 1941 LEG. Doc. No. 65(M), REPORT, N. Y. LAW R EVIsIoN CO..xMSSIoN
401 (1941).20 See Legis., 26 CORNELL L. Q. 692, 698 (1941); Recent Statutes, 41 COL.
L. REv. 553, 556 (1941).
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satisfactory.21 Dissatisfaction arose primarily because the seal, on
its face, failed to reveal that its affixing could nullify changes which
the parties might later desire to make. This hidden significance,
therefore, was capable of causing as much harm to an unknowing
person as it could bring benefit to a party who realized its effect.
In addition, an unacquainted contractor never received any other no-
tice of the real character of his contract for "[n] either at the time of
the execution . . . nor subsequently when the question of modifica-
tion arises, is there any indication from the instrument that it cannot
be modified orally .... ,, 22 When, therefore, the objection of "no
notice" was combined with the spreading desire to reject other tech-
nical features of the seal, the stage was manifestly set for legislative
action.
In New York, the legislature first moved to remedy this situa-
tion in 1941. Since that time, however, because of a well-reasoned
:fear that the spirit of the statutory remedy was being violated, a re-
vision of considerable import was necessary. Both the original enact-
ment and the recently approved revision have adopted the same ap-
proach to the problem; and, taken together, constitute an essential
part in the barrier against fraud.23  It will be the purpose here to
examine and interpret these legislative enactments and the restraint
placed on the right to modify orally or terminate written agreements,
all in the light of the statute's common law antecedents.
Legislative Action-Phase I
The initial 24 act of the New York legislature nullified the legal
effectiveness of the seal and reduced its function to that of authenti-
cating documents.25 In place of the seal, there was adopted the fol-
lowing provision:
[A]n executory agreement . .. shall be ineffective to change or modify,
or to discharge in whole or in part, a written agreement . . . which contains
a provision to the effect that it cannot be changed orally, unless such executory
agreement is' in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement
of the change, modification or discharge is sought.... 26
By its express terms, the statute made the sole bar to modifica-
tion or discharge, by way of an oral executory agreement, a provision
21 See note 19 sipra.
22 1941 LEG. Doc. No. 65(M), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVIsION CommissloN
402 (1941).
23 Cowen, Assault on Written Agreements, 10 N. Y. Co. L. A. B. BULL. 11,
12 (1952).
24 Previous enactments dealing with the efficacy of the seal, left undisturbed
the rule that presence of a seal restricted oral, executory contract modification.
25 1941 LEG. Doc. No. 65(M), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvIsION CoMMIssION
353 (1941).26N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(l); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §282(1)
(contains similar provision).
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in the contract forbidding such an occurrence. In this way, it vital-
ized provisions which were previously adjudged ineffectual for the
purpose, since they themselves could be repudiated by the mutual ac-
tion of the parties.2 7  And, at the same time, it conferred an un-
changeable status on contracts which contained a "no oral change"
provision. The law overcame the lack of notice problem which char-
acterized the seal by insisting that the words of prohibition be in-
cluded in the contract. This not only made the agreement correspond
more closely with the intention of the parties, but, also extended
statutory protection only to those parties who contractually expressed
their desire for its coverage.
It is equally important to notice that, as a consequence of the
statute's exclusive concern with executory agreements, it was basically
substitutional in nature, i.e., requiring a provision rather than a seal.
As such, it seemingly did not disturb the case law previously de-
veloped. Therefore, executed agreements of modification and those
which rested on detrimental reliance would, even when the writing
forbade oral modification, apparently still be recognized.
2S
But while the statute was substitutional and dealt with only ex-
ecutory agreements, its administrative life was short.29 During this
period however, it was held that a provision forbidding oral change or
modification was effective to prevent termination of a contract. 3° As
logical as this ruling was, a seemingly minor factual variation thereof
proved the undoing of the law. The first case on the statute in the
New York Court of Appeals dealt with such a situation and pointed
up the incompleteness of the statute. There the court said, that, al-
though the applicability of the statute was dependent upon its invo-
cation by the parties, those contracting could, by so providing, forbid
oral changes yet simultaneously permit oral discharge.3 1 In other
words, the protection of the statute was severable and would apply,
in whole or in part, as the parties desired. However, application of
this doctrine to the instant contract, which contained not only a "no
oral change" clause but also provided for unilateral termination by
27 See note 9 supra.
28 1936 Lmo. Doc. No. 65(C), REPoRT, N. Y. LAw REvisxio CommIssioN
356 (1936).
29 It covered the period from 1941 to 1952. During this limited period
there was a seeming lack of litigation involving the statute. For representa-
tive cases, see Central American Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Mercantile Ship
Repair Co., 73 F. Supp. 779 (E. D. N. Y. 1947) (admiralty is not bound by
such statutes); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow Co., 39 F. Supp. 100
(S. D. N. Y. 1941); Shine's Restaurant v. Waiter and Waitresses Union,
Local No. 1, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Glasser & Son, Inc. v.
Jonwal Construction Co., 186 Misc. 253, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Molina v. Barany, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (assignment of con-
tract is not a modification).
30 Siegel v. Goodman, 186 Misc. 108, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
31 Green v. Doniger, 300 N. Y. 238, 90 N. E. 2d 56 (1949). See 50 COL.
L. Rrv. 700 (1950) ; 1 SYRAcusE L. REv. 517 (1950).
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either on thirty days written notice, led to difficulty. The court felt
that this contract could be abandoned by the mutual, oral consent of
the parties since the clause permitting termination by one party, with-
out consent, was inconsistent with the idea that the parties sought
statutory protection against oral discharge. And, because it was in-
consistent, it limited the applicability of the "no oral change" provi-
sion exclusively to modifications rather than to the usual combination
of both change and discharge8 2
Notwithstanding the benefits of contract flexibility provided by
separable statutory protection, there was a well-founded fear that
the purpose of the law was being frustrated.8 Under these circum-
stances, it was obvious that, by alleging an abandonment followed by
the adoption of an oral agreement, which incorporated a desired
change, one party could obtain approval of an otherwise forbidden
change. Fraudulent or mistaken claims of modification might suc-
cessfully be made in spite of the presence of the preventative clause.
However, the danger of fraud or mistake inherent in the interpreted
statute was not its only weakness. Instead, this decision revealed
that the old ogre of "no notice" which accompanied the seal, was still
in the law.34 Parties to a contract, which contained a "no oral
change" provision, might be unaware that it had the effect of pro-
hibiting oral termination. Thus, the same chance of injustice, based
on the hidden significance of the clause, was to be found. This con-
dition, however, soon elicited legislative action.
Legislative Action-Phase II
The legislative antidote for this situation may be found in an
enactment which became law on September 1, 1952.85 Under its
terms, the applicability of statutory protection to a contract is still
dependent upon the manifested intent of the parties. That is to say,
those contracting must first include a provision against oral change
or discharge in order to be protected.3 Upon their failure to do so,
the contract will be governed, with but one exception,37 by the previ-
32 Green v. Doniger, supra note 31 at 245, 90 N. E. 2d at 59.
3 3 Id. at 246-247, 90 N. E. 2d at 60-61 (dissenting opinion). 1951 LEG.
Doc. No. 65(N), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION (1951) (pro-
posed statute to overcome rule in Green case, supra note 31).
3 1952 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION
(1952).
35 Laws of N. Y. 1952, c. 831, § 1 (effective Sept. 1, 1952), amending N. Y.
PEs. PROP. LAw § 33-c; Laws of N. Y. 1952, c. 831, § 2 (effective Sept. 1,
1952), amending N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 282.36 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(1); N. Y. REA. PROP. LAW §282(1)
(effective Sept. 1, 1941). N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(2); N. Y. REAL
PROP. LAw §282(2) (effective Sept. 1, 1952).37 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §33-c(4); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §282(4)(effective Sept. 1, 1952).
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ously discussed common law, which generally allowed modification.
But while the approach to the problem remained the same, the
new law relies on more exact, specific definition to eliminate the frus-
tration of protection exhibited under its statutory predecessor. The
statute as it is presently constituted, may be divided into three gen-
eral operating sections: first, it separates statutory protection into
two distinct classes by requiring separate provisions to protect against
either oral change 31 or oral termination; 39 second, it outlines, in
detail, the precise impact of a "no oral termination" clause; 40 and,
third, it acts to influence contractual provisions permitting unilateral
termination upon notice.41 Analysis of each of these sections is neces-
sary in order to understand this method of correction and clarification.
Separation of Statutory Protection
As previously mentioned, the theory that a "no oral change"
provision prevented oral termination was inadequate. Under certain
circumstances, i.e., when there was evidence of contrary intention,
it might recognize fraudulent claims; and, even standing alone, the
clause gave no notice of its complete meaning.42 Happily, however,
these difficulties were removed by incorporating into the law the judi-
cial theory of severable protection. Changes have been completely
distinguished from terminations; 43 and, either, or both, may only be
prevented by including a contract clause which specifically outlaws
their effectiveness when unwritten.44 In addition, a strong blow in
the battle against ambiguity was struck by a legislative definition of
the terms "change" and "termination." Change not only covers
modifications or variations in contract terms, etc., but also includes
partial discharges of the contract, which do not terminate all execu-
tory obligations under the agreement.45 Termination, on the other
hand, is the discharge of all executory obligations but needn't affect
those accrued obligations which were unperformed at the date of the
contract's termination.46
38N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(1); N. Y. REAI. PROp. LAW §282(1)
(effective Sept. 1, 1941).39 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §33-c(2); N. Y. REAL. PROP. LAW §282(2)
(effective Sept. 1, 1952).40 N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAw § 33-c(2), (3) (c), (4) ; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW§282(2), (3)(c), (4).
41N. Y. PErs. PROP. LAW §33-c(4); N. Y. RE.AL PROP. LAW §282(4).
4? 1952 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPoRT, N. Y. LAW REVIsION CommissIoN
(1952).
43 See notes 38 and 39 supra.
44 Ibid.
45 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(3)(a); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 282(3) (a).
46N. Y. PFaS. PROP. LAW §33-c(3)(b); N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW
§ 282(3) (b).
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Concededly, complete definition is difficult, perhaps impossible;
but, the statutory exposition of these terms must certainly act to
benefit both the contracting parties and the courts. The parties, for
the first time, are given a guide to the precise contract variations
which may be outlawed by the use of either change or termination
provisions. And, so acquainted, they may easily and correctly ex-
press their desires in the contract. If, however, difficulties of inter-
pretation result in litigation, it would seem that the courts could help
establish the intent of the parties by examining the contract in the
light of the law's explanation.
Impact of a No Oral Termination Clause
Broadly stated, the inclusion of a clause prohibiting oral ter-
mination prevents the contract from being discharged by any method
except by a writing or by a particular type of executed accord and
satisfaction.47  More specifically however, a writing, setting forth
the termination agreement, and signed by the party against whom it
is sought to be enforced, or his agent, is necessary under several cir-
cumstances. Among such instances are: first, where discharge is
sought by an executory agreement; 48 second, in cases of termination
by mutual consent; 49 and third, where the contract specifically pro-
vides for termination or discharge on notice by one or either party. 50
The legislative desire for a writing is so strong that in the last of
these instances, i.e., where notice by a party is sufficient to terminate,
an oral notice is ineffectual even though the contract fails to state
that it be written.5 1 Although the law demands a written notice
while the parties seemingly would have been satisfied with an oral
one, this cannot be interpreted as an actual case of legislative contract
making. Instead, it represents the creation of a conclusive presump-
tion that the clause forbidding an oral termination, which must be
present before the notice need be written, is of paramount impor-
tance in the eyes of the contracting parties. And, because of this
superior position, it will be followed rather than an incomplete pro-
vision, which fails to state how the notice is to be given, or instead
of an inconsistent clause, which specifically permits oral notice. Fur-
thermore, as an additional safeguard, no mutual assent of the parties,
unless evidenced by a writing, will be effective to waive the require-
ment that such notice of discharge be written, even though the con-
tract is silent on this need.52
47 See note 40 supra.
48 N. Y. P&Rs. PROP. LAW § 33-c(2) ; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 282(2).
49 Ibid.
50N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(3)(c); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§282(3) (c).
51 Ibid.
52 N. Y. Puis. PROP. LAW § 33-c(4) ; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 282(4).
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But, as already noted, a writing is not the only way in which
the mutual consent of the parties may terminate a statutorily protected
contract.5 3 When the mutual consent to terminate is effected by an
executed accord and satisfaction, ". . . other than the substitution
of one executory contract for another .... " 54 the contract is deemed
terminated. By the inclusion of this provision, the enactment has
recognized the widely held rule that satisfaction of a subsequent ac-
cord, by performance of its terms, discharges the duties of the parties
under their prior contract. 55 The exclusion of the substituted execu-
tory contract as a satisfaction, however, represents, in this somewhat
narrow field, the limitation of an otherwise accepted method of ren-
dering satisfaction."" The cases have been designated as those in
which the accord itself acts as the satisfaction and are found fre-
quently in contracts of compromise, settlement or those which rescind
previous contractual duties.67 Nevertheless, the limitation imposed is
not unreasonable. Not only do these contracts present an oppor-
tunity for false claims of a new and substituted oral executory con-
tract, but even the rationale itself has been criticized as "stretching
a point" IS and as actually enforcing an executory accord.5 9
Influence on Unilateral Termination Provisions
When the instrument expressly permits unilateral termination
of the contract on written notice of a party, the statute has automatic
application. 60 In the presence of such a provision, the statute limits
the common law right of the parties to mutually waive the require-
53 See note 40 supra.54 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(2); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §282(2).
For typical cases dealing with the substitution of one executory contract for
another, see Moers v. Moers, 229 N. Y. 294, 128 N. E. 202 (1920); Bandman
v. Finn, 185 N. Y. 508, 78 N. E. 175 (1906); Morehouse v. Second National
Bank of Oswego, 98 N. Y. 503 (1885) ; Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574 (1879).
55 "From time immemorial the acceptance of anything in satisfaction of
the damages caused by a tort would bar a subsequent action against a wrong-
doer. Accord and satisfaction was, likewise, a bar to any action for damages
arising from a breach of a covenant." Ames, Specialty Cmtracts and Equi-
table Defences, 9 HARV. L. Rav. 49, 55 (1895); Schnell v. Perlmon, 238 N. Y.
362, 144 N. E. 641 (1924) ; see RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 417(b) (1932).
56 See cases cited in note 54 supra.5 7 RSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 418 (1932).
58 6 WnI uSTON, CONTRACTS § 1847 n. 1 (rev. ed. 1938).
59 6 CoRniN, CONTRACTS § 1271 (1951). Executory accords are not enforce-
able. See Moers v. Moers, 229 N. Y. 294, 300, 128 N. E. 202, 203 (1920);
Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574, 576 (1879). Yet, "[tihe fact is that any
accord executory can be turned into an enforceable contract by the device of
calling it a substituted contract; and the court is likely to do this whenever
justice seems to require it .... The rule to be adopted . . . is that an execu-
tory accord is an enforceable contract if it complies with the ordinary rules
for the formation of a contract." 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1271 (1951).SON. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §33-c(4); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §282(4).
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ment that the notice be written.6 ' Under the statute, such notice of
termination, to be effective, cannot be oral, and any allegation of a
waiver of this requirement will be ignored.6 2 Here then is the only
circumstance under which the statute is effective even though the
parties have not sought its aid by specific contract invocation. Al-
though admittedly, this derogation of a common law right is of nar-
row compass, it represents an example of legislative contract making.
As such, it is a, step toward the usual statutory requirement that all
unexecuted alterations of written contracts be in writing.63 Despite
this minor rejection of the theory that the expressed intention of the
parties should govern the applicability of the statute, it is submitted
that, even apart from the present law, there is evidence of an un-
willingness to increase the legislative role of contract making. For
example, when the Law Revision Commission originally recom-
mended statutory revision, they believed that ". . . where a contract
provides for termination by one or either party on notice, such notice
to be effective must be in writing, and waiver of the requirement
* , . must be in writing." 64 However, when the proposal was later
resubmitted, a writing was sought only for contracts which contained
either a "no oral termination" clause 65 or a provision permitting
written discharge alone.66 As enacted therefore, the law does not
cover those contracts which authorize unilateral termination without
a writing. Since these had seemingly been covered by the first pro-
posal and since their later exclusion was necessarily deliberate, it
would seem to further evince a desire to retain the intention of the
parties test.
Conclusion
A fraudulent act is a heinous thing. Equally damaging, though
less reprehensible, is the mistaken claim. While this similarity of
result often makes them indistinguishable, the public interest demands
protection against the successful accomplishment of either or both.
Within the narrow field of oral, executory contract modification or
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 The typical statute preventing oral modification provides that: "A con-
tract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed
oral agreement and not otherwise." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698 (1951). This stat-
ute applies to all written contracts, and not merely to those forbidding oral
modifications. For a criticism of this type of statute, see 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs§ 1295 n. 30 (1951).
64 1951 LEG. Doc. No. 65(N), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvisiON CommissioN
(1951).
65 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-c(2); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 282(2).
See 1952 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REviSioN CommISSION
(1952).
66N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(4); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §282(4).
See 1952 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvIsiON COMMISSION(1952).
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termination, the instant statute constitutes the means of achieving
this goal. But, although its purpose and its demand for a writing
are akin to the Statute of Frauds, these enactments generally differ
in one important respect. Here, it is not the nature of the subject
matter which cloaks the statute 'round the contract; instead, it is the
deliberate invocation by the parties which attaches the law's protec-
tion. Yet, in spite of this voluntary nature and its limited scope, the
statute provides an important safeguard in the struggle against con-
tract fraud.
The history of the law restricting contract modification, however,
indicates that the statute has been concerned with more than the
false claims of contracting parties. Although its creation was de-
signed primarily to prevent fraud, a second, and quite important,
reason motivated its adoption. The law presented the method of
eliminating the anomalous lack of notice feature which characterized
its predecessor, the seal. Strangely enough, judicial interpretation
soon revealed that the legislative remedy itself suffered from the same
ambiguity of no notice.
Now, the law has been rewritten; and its new, more definitive
terminology sets forth, in a complete manner, the legal effect of a
"no oral change or discharge" clause. Contracting parties may in
the future safely insert such preventative clauses as they desire. And,
the courts will be assured that such insertion was made with full
knowledge of its effect and, as such, accurately represents the desired
intention of the parties. In brief, with the difficulty of ambiguity
seemingly removed, the statute stands ready to fulfill its primary
purpose of protecting contracting parties from fraud.
X
ARTICLE 66-AN EXTRAORDINARY REmEDY
Introduction
Replevin was one of the earliest actions conceived by the law.1
Originally it was believed that the action would lie only for the re-
covery of chattels illegally distrained,2 and this limited scope was
recognized by several states.3 However, the weight of authority later
I See Three States Lumber Co. v. Blanks, 133 Fed. 479, 481 (6th Cir.
1904) ; Stone v. Church, 172 Misc. 1007, 1003, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 512, 515 (County
Ct. 1939).
2 3 Bi- Comm. 147. A distrained chattel is one that is held as a pledge
until the pledgor performs an obligation.
3 Wheelock v. Cozzens, 6 How. 279 (Miss. 1842) ; see NVatson v. Watson,
9 Conn. 140, 143 (1832).
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